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The Recession: Is It Over? 

In our last analysis, which appeared in 
the February issue of West Michigan 
Magazine, we speculated that the reces­
sion, which began last summer, would 
soon end. At this time, however, there 
are stU! conflicting signs concerning the 
timing of the turnaround. While there 
are some indications that the bottom has 
been reached, there are other signs that 
the recession is continuing but the de­
cline is at a much slower pace. While it 
will take several months to verify whether 
or not turnaround is actually in progress, 
the odds are that if the recession is not 
already over, it soon will be. 
In March, part of the uncertainty about 
the timing of the turnaround revolved 
around the extent to which economic 
activity had been unduly depressed by 
the weather in January and the extent to 
which all or some of the improved per­
formance in February represented a 
"bounceback" from that While a num­
ber of economic indicators have im­
proved recently, others continue to 
deteriorate. Among those that are be­
having consistent with a turnaround are 
retail sales, construction spending, prices 
of sensitive commodities at the whole­
sale level, along with some measures of 
durable goods orders and unfilled or­
ders. Other series, however, continue to 
deteriorate, indicating that the recovery 
is still in the distance. Among these are 
leading indicators, personal and busi­
ness bankruptcies, help-wanted adver­
tising, and the unemployment rate. The 
last two of these lag behind overall activ­
ity, however, and would be expected to 
deteriorate even in the face of a turn­
around. 
So far, the recession has had most, but 
not all, of the trappings of the classic 
downturn. The exception has been in­
terest rates. Real Gross National Product 
(GNP after adjustment for inflation) fell 
sharply (about 4% seasonally adjusted 
annual rate) during the last two quarters. 
Unemployment has risen from 7% in 
July, 1981, to 9%. Real final sales (GNP 
less the increase in business inventories) 
has fallen 2+% since the first quarter of 
1981. Industrial production has declined 
sharply as has the rate of utilization of 
manufacturing capacity. Last, and worse 
for Michigan, the housing and auto In­
dustries are still in their own depreSSion, 
and new housing starts are near rock­
bottom levels, as are automobile assem­
blies and sales. 
These are the painful effects of the 
recession. The benefit is the precipitous 
rate at which inflation has declined. The 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been 
rising at about 1 % so far this year, com­
pared with almost 9% last year. And 
prices actually dropped, for the first time 
in 17 years in March. Although inflation 
will not continue at this low rate indefi­
nitely, it appears that the cycle of ever­
increasing inflation has been stopped. 
The recent contract concessions in the 
auto industry are symptomatic of the fact 
that the back of inflation has finally been 
broken. 
At this point, with the exception of 
interest rates, the fundamentals should 
be in place for an upturn. Monetary pol­
icy has been stimulative for almost six 
months, and fiscal policy (federal tax and 
expenditure policy) is becoming stimu­
lative after being contractionary through 
most of 1981. Also, business inventories 
are coming under control, setting the 
stage for increased production. 
The "fly in the Ointment," so to speak, 
is high interest rates which, although 
much lower than they were last summer, 
are still very high for a recession. The 
major problem with interest rates is the 
demand-depressing effect of the high 
"real" (inflation-adjusted) interest rates. 
Technically, real rates are nominal inter­
est rates minus the inflation expected to 
occur over the time period the rate is to 
cover. For instance, if the rate on a one­
year treasury bill is 13 % and the markets 
expect inflation of 9% over the next 
year, the real rate is 4%. In computing 
real rates, however, some observers had 
compared the short-term interest rates 
of 13% to 15% around the first of the 
year with the inflation rate of about 4% 
on the CPI at that time and had con­
cluded that the real short-term rate is a 
backbreaking 9-11 %. 
This analysis is wrong and misleading 
for the following reasons. First, 4% is too 
Iowa rate for future inflation. The recent 
inflation rate on the CPI has been unsus­
tainably low in recent months. Before 
too long, the recorded rate will move 
back up to the basic rate, which is now 
around 8%. Also, the CPI is not a com­
prehensive enough measure of inflation 
for the whole economy. The GNP defla­
tor is a better measure, and it rose at 9% 
in 1981, before temporarily slowing 
down in the first quarter of 1982. In ad­
dition, as indicated above, the appropri­
2 
ate inflation rate to use in computing the 
real interest rate is the forward-looking • 
expected inflation rate, not the past rate. 
Thus, the real rate of interest is still very 
high-about 4-5%-but much lower 
than some observers have claimed. 
One last note about the recession. It is 
not only unfortunate because it is taking 
such a terrible toll, but it was probably 
unnecessary! It was the almost inadver­
tent result of a combination of a mone­
tary policy and a Federal fiscal policy 
which were simultaneously tight (con­
tractionary), because of their timing. 
Originally, the Reagan Administration 
had planned that fiscal policy would be 
neutral. But after the enactment of the 
tax cut in 1981, fiscal policy was thought 
to be stimulative. So far, however, the 
stimulative effects of the federal income 
tax cuts have been offset by other tax 
increases and by expenditure cuts. Thus, 
it is a misconception that fiscal policy has 
been stimulative. This misconception 
arose out of the notion that a tax cut 
program had been passed and that would 
produce large budget deficits in the 
future. 
The real key to the fiscal-policy effect 
on the demand for goods and services • 
has been the timing of the cuts in Federal 
expenditures and of the tax rate cuts that 
have actually occurred. The expenditure 
cuts had their effects first, redUcing total 
demand, starting in 1981. Contrary to 
popular belief, the tax cuts did not occur 
in mid-1981 and, for the most part, have 
not occurred yet. When they do, they 
will have their impacts gradually. Thus, 
fiscal policy has actually been contrac­
tionary at the same time as the Federal 
Reserve pursued a tight monetary pol­
icy. Unfortunately, monetary policy has 
alternated between tightness and ease 
within the year, while achieving its (ap­
propriate) targets for the year as a whole. 
The effects of the timing of these policies 
have been combined with the expecta­
tion of large federal deficits in the future, 
which have produced high interest rates 
in advance. Those high rates have 
crushed the housing market, contrib­
uted to depression in the auto industry, 
and cut into other areas of demand as 
well. Thus, we have had the "crowding 
out" of private demand, by Federal gov­
ernment actions that were thought to be 
stimulative, in advance of their actual A 
occurrence. The result has been the worst .. 
of both worlds. 
(Continued on page 8) 
The Recession: Is It Over? 

(ContinuedJrom page 2) 
The reasons for the high interest rates could well have been lost again as they The major concern now is not that the 
are still the Federal government's defi­
cits, which are very high and expected to 
be higher in the future, plus continued 
high borrowing by business, along with 
the increased risk of lending. Current 
business borrowing is more involuntary 
than planned in that firms are often bor­
rowing to finance unsold inventories and 
to make interest and dividend payments, 
rather than expand in a planned way. 
Another reason for the high interest 
rates is the enormous risk of holding 
bonds. When interest rates rise, bond 
prices fall and holders can incur capital 
losses (along with reduced buying power 
due to inflation). In recent years, interest 
rates and bond prices have been far 
more volatile than in the past, and this 
has increased the risk of holding bonds. 
Add to all of this the increased risk of 
default associated with loans and debt 
securities these days, and the result is 
high real interest rates. Economic recov­
ery, smaller federal deficits, and higher 
saving by the private sector will solve 
most of the interest-rate problem, if they 
can be brought about more or less 
simultaneously. 
The issue now becomes what, if any­
thing, to do about the current situation. 
At this pOint, stimulative actions by the 
Federal government to effect a turn­
around should be out of the question, 
because the economy will be improving 
before those actions would have their 
impact. Thus, the effects of these actions 
would occur only after they are needed. 
But even worse than the prospect of pol­
icy actions that are too late is the pros­
pect of counterproductive actions. 
Washington does not appear to be dom­
inated by people who understand aggre­
gate-demand management. The current 
mood is to cut the Federal deficit to bring 
interest rates down. To do this, Federal 
fiscal policy will turn more contraction­
ary than it is now programmed to be. 
Very probably, then, when the Congress 
finishes its attempts to control the deficits 
and interest rates, effective tax rates will 
have been raised again, one way or the 
other, and some of the defense buildup 
aborted. 
These, of course, are the "easy" ways 
to attempt to get the Federal deficit under 
control. The opportunities to make the 
really tough decisions that would get 
Federal spending under control, and 
which must be faced sooner if not later, 
have so many times in the past. Raising 
tax rates directly, or letting inflation do it, 
and cutting defense spending are, of 
course, the old game of "politics as 
usual," and Federal spending will still be 
out of control. 
But these comments are addressed to 
the priOrities of fiscal policy. The timing 
is something else. Only the recent stale­
mate over what to do has kept Congress 
from engaging in 1930's DepresSion-style 
economics of tightening fiscal policy and 
redUCing total demand for goods and 
services while the recession is still in 
progress. It is probably just fortuitous, 
then, that actions to correct the deficit 
will be taken at a future time so that their 
effects will not be felt until such time as 
fiscal policy finally becomes stimulative 
and the economy is well on its way to 
recovery. What, then, should we do now? 
The way some politicians talk, the per­
sonal income tax cut that President Rea­
gan asked for and got was the cause of 
our current troubles. This is not true. The 
cuts in the personal tax rates have only 
succeeded in offsetting recent and ex­
pected near term "bracket creep." 
Bracket creep is the situation in which 
your real income goes down but your 
Federal personal income taxes go up! 
The enormous deficits expected to occur 
in the future are part of the problem. The 
deficits are the result of a number of 
factors. Among these are the excess tax 
concessions that Congress added to the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
which were over and above the Presi­
dent's requests, the underruns in expen­
diture cuts, overruns in other expen­
ditures, the reduction in income and tax 
collections due to the recession, and re­
visions in the overly optimistic and un­
realistic projections upon which much of 
the economic program had originally 
been based. Except for a few specific 
programs, the Federal budget has not 
been cut as much as we have been led 
to believe. Even with all of the talk of 
expenditure cuts and associated tales of 
woe, the Federal budget is running well 
above President Reagan's target. In fact, 
at apprOximately $730 billion for fiscal 
1982, it is much closer to Jimmy Carter's 
prOjection than to Ronald Reagan's. 
Federal spending is up about $70 billion 
this year, and that amounts to a rate of 
growth in excess of the growth of the 
overall economy, again! 
recession will not end. It will, and there 
wUl be no "depression." The concern e 
now is for the strained financial position 
of some American families and business 
firms. Business liquidity is at low levels 
and is deteriorating, and business and 
personal bankruptcies will continue at 
high levels until after the recession is 
over. As things now stand, it appears a 
certainty that the recession will have 
ended by late summer. By then, the sec­
ond stage of the Administration's per­
sonal income tax cut will be in effect. 
This will give households an enormous 
boost in buying power. The 10% reduc­
tion in tax rates is expected to increase 
personal disposable income by about 
2% per month. This should be large 
enough to offset the effects on the 
households of the high interest rates, 
higher state and local government tax 
rates, and the reduction in government 
support for college students, for middle 
income taxpayers, at least. The recovery 
will probably not be as strong as recov­
eries usually are, because interest rates 
will still be high by historical standards, 
although they could be a good bit lower 
then than they are now. 
As for Michigan, none of our readers 
need be reminded of the economic plight •of the state. Unemployment is over 
16%-the highest in the country-and 
the real disposable income of the people 
is still dropping. Since the state economy 
is still auto-related, and the domestic 
auto industry is still cyclical, the state's 
recovery must wait for the national re­
covery. Thus, improvement in the Mich­
igan economy is several months off. 
This does not address the structural 
situation in the auto industry, however. 
There, fundamental changes in demand 
and supply conditions have occurred 
and will continue for some time. Al­
though the industry will never regain the 
employment levels of the past, there can 
be cautious optimism that a combination 
of factors will produce a healthier indus­
try in the next few years. Among these 
are the increased concern for quality, 
improved productivity through easier 
work rules and the increased use of ro­
botics, and a marked slowdown in the 
rise of autoworkers' wages, unit labor 
costs, and car prices. Combined with a 
strong backlog of demand, these should 
produce a healthier auto industry in the 
future. •John O. Bornhofen, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
of Economics and Finance 
